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We gratefully acknowledge the contributions, advice, and support of Carl E. Englund, Larry T. Dallen, Holly Forcier, Steve Howard, and David Gaba. Norman Ty Smith was a critical contributor to a previous version of the chapter.
This chapter discusses several areas in which the interface between human and machine—or more accurately, between the anesthesia caregiver and the anesthesia equipment—plays a crucial role in patient outcomes. At first glance, the topics may seem unrelated. However, vigilance, alarms, and integrated monitoring systems are, in fact, closely interrelated.
The administration of anesthesia is a complex monitoring task and, as such, requires sustained vigilance. Unfortunately, humans are not very good at monitoring because we are error-prone, and our vigilance is susceptible to degradation by a variety of human, environmental, and equipment factors. Designers of anesthesia equipment therefore have attempted to aid the anesthesia caregiver by incorporating devices and systems that augment vigilance and clinical performance. Alarms intended to notify the anesthesia provider of potentially critical situations are effective only if properly designed and implemented. Although many modern anesthesia delivery devices are physically integrated and generally contain systems for gas delivery, monitoring, alarms, and sometimes record keeping, many of the promised benefits of full-scale integration (e.g., “smart” alarms, decision aids) are as of yet not quite fulfilled. The successful implementation of comprehensive integrated anesthesia workstations will require further technologic advances as well as a more complete understanding of the task of administering anesthesia and the factors that affect performance of the anesthesia caregiver in this complex human/machine environment. Research to elucidate these “performance-shaping factors” in anesthesia has been under way for a number of years and is beginning to produce results. Chapter 18 discusses the role that the field of human factors should play in modern anesthesia practice.
In 1985, as many as 3000 preventable incidences of anesthesia-related death or brain damage were estimated to occur in the United States each year. In 2015, Nunnally et al. cite an incidence of perioperative cardiac arrest at 5.6 per 10,000 anesthetics. Although some believe that anesthesia has become safer, many more surgical procedures are now being performed; thus the absolute number of adverse events is certainly not decreasing. In addition, patients undergoing surgery today may be older and sicker than they were in 1985, a consequence of population demographics and economically-driven changes in the U.S. health care delivery system—a fact that might delay, but will not prevent, the use of surgical therapy. A group found a 10-fold reduction in anesthesia-related deaths between 1979 and 1999 in France. In 2009, Li et al. found an incidence of anesthesia-related death at approximately 1 per million population in the United States and approximately 8 per million surgical discharges. Finally, studies suggest that “potentially serious” clinical events are actually quite common in anesthetized patients, but relatively few evolve into adverse patient outcomes. A number of investigators have suggested that human error is a major contributor to the occurrence of anesthetic mishaps. , For example, clinician errors, such as making an accidental gas flow change or a “syringe swap,” accounted for up to 70% of anesthetic mishaps in two early studies. , In an early, but highly publicized study by Keenan and Boyan, 75% of intraoperative cardiac arrests were attributed to preventable anesthetic errors; an analysis of incidents under monitored anesthesia care concluded that nearly half of the claims could have been prevented by better monitoring.
In the intensive care unit (ICU), clinical errors often may be associated with failed communication among care providers. On the other hand, as is discussed in detail later in this chapter, the majority of adverse anesthesia incidents are likely the result of systemic factors over which the anesthesia provider has little or no control, such as device designs that predispose to human error.
Even under ideal conditions, performance on complicated tasks is rarely perfect. In complex systems involving both humans and machines, human error is almost always a factor in degraded or faulty performance. , In aviation, for example, the percent of accidents that resulted from air crew error was reported to be greater than 50%. Accidents usually are caused by the cumulative effect of a number of events rather than one isolated incident. , Why do highly trained and experienced individuals make errors? What factors influence the occurrence of these errors? What can be done to decrease their incidence or to mitigate their negative outcome? Research has only begun to provide adequate answers to these important questions.
Errors are a normal component of human cognitive function and play an important role in learning. Most errors do not result in damaging consequences, but when an error results in an unacceptable outcome, it often is called an accident. An error is most likely to deteriorate into a damaging situation when conditions prevent the appropriate corrective responses. Errors committed by anesthesia caregivers can have catastrophic consequences if not corrected, yet Cooper and colleagues showed that most critical events in anesthetic practice were discovered and corrected before a serious mishap occurred. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the determinants of recovery from anesthetic errors; factors such as sleep deprivation, miscommunication, or equipment problems can increase the potential for error as well as preclude effective recovery.
Two types of error are slips and mistakes ( Table 17.1 ). Both of these can take the form of errors of omission (omitting a task step or even an entire task) or errors of commission (incorrect performance). Slips are most likely to occur during activities for which one is highly trained and that are therefore performed outside active conscious thought. Drug syringe swaps, a commonly described anesthetic critical event, are a type of slip. Errors of omission can occur when unexpected distractions interrupt a well-established behavioral sequence. Errors of commission occur when automated schema, or preprogrammed subroutines, are inappropriately called into play by specific stimuli without conscious processing. Individuals have a tendency to revert to a high-frequency (well-engrained) response in such situations, particularly when under stress. In fact, experts may be more likely than novices to make these kinds of errors.
Type of Error | Description |
---|---|
Mistake | Inappropriate intention or action, often the result of a lack of training or knowledge |
Slip | Appropriate intention or action at inappropriate time |
Mode error | Erroneous classification of the situation |
Description error | Ambiguous or incomplete specification of intention |
Capture error | Correct schemata at incorrect time, often because of task overlap |
Faulty activation | Activation of inappropriate action or failure to activate appropriate action |
Data-driven error | Automatic actions inappropriate for the situation but called into play by ongoing action sequences |
Fixation errors | Failure to revise actions with changing conditions, “cognitive lockup” |
Confirmation bias a | Tendency to seek confirming data for existing hypotheses |
Representational Errors | Faulty mental model of the system and its function or malfunction |
a Errors may also occur as a result of a variety of other types of cognitive bias, such as availability, representativeness, similarity, framing, and anchoring. , ,
In a study of anesthesia residents working in a comprehensive anesthesia simulation environment, DeAnda and Gaba documented 132 unplanned incidents (i.e., not part of the simulation script but rather created by the subject) during 19 simulations, at a rate of nearly two per case. Human error accounted for 86% of the incidents, whereas equipment failure only accounted for 3%. Of the incidents that resulted from human error, nearly one-quarter were the result of so-called fixation errors, which occurred when the subject was unable to focus on the most critical problem at hand because of persistent, inappropriate attention or actions directed elsewhere. The overall incidence of human error observed during simulated anesthesia was similar to that suggested by Cooper and colleagues for anesthesiologists in the operating room (OR). This study is important because it substantiates the frequent occurrence of error in anesthesia and validates the use of simulation to study the types and causes of critical incidents in anesthesia. Clinical decision-making also can be adversely affected by a number of other types of cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias, inappropriate overconfidence, false attribution, the availability and representativeness heuristics, anchoring, and framing.
In contrast to slips and fixation errors, mistakes are technical or judgmental errors. Thus, mistakes are due to inadequate or incorrect information, poor decision-making skills or inappropriate strategies, inadequate training, lack of experience, and/or insufficient supervision or backup.
People are more likely to make errors when they are mismatched to the task or the system is not user-friendly. Factors that can influence error commission include skill level, attitude, inexperience, stress, poor supervision, task complexity, and inadequate system design ( Table 17.2 ). The topic of human error in anesthesia has been covered in some detail elsewhere.
Cause of Error | Representative Example |
---|---|
Human Factors | |
Task complexity | Not ventilating when coming off cardiopulmonary bypass |
Lack of training or experience | Rapid administration of vancomycin or protamine |
Stress | Drug, syringe or ampoule swap during critical situation |
Ill health | Under the influence of prescribed or recreational substances |
Environmental Factors | |
Noise/miscommunication | Misheard surgeon and gave wrong antibiotic |
Workplace constraints | Circuit disconnect from moving equipment or personnel |
Equipment and System Factors | |
Poor equipment design | Lightbulb goes out on laryngoscope during an intubation |
False and/or noisy alarms | Failure to recognize critical situation after disabling alarms |
Mismatch of human/machine functions | Failure to detect ongoing event while manually recording vital signs |
At least some of what, on first glance, appears to be human error often can be traced back to poorly designed human/machine interfaces. In fact, Norman suggests that “the real culprit in most errors or accidents involving complex systems is, almost always, poor design.” Poor operational design can substantially increase the risk of system failure as a result of operator error. Factors related to system-induced error include boredom attributable to overautomation, overreliance on automated devices, and poor team coordination. Good operating practice is essential but not sufficient for minimizing system risk: (1) the design of the system must be fundamentally sound, (2) it must be properly constructed and implemented, (3) the operators must be thoroughly familiar with the system, and (4) ongoing quality control must ensure that system use is appropriate over the full range of possible conditions. This applies to the anesthesia workspace and must be considered when introducing new equipment into this unique environment.
Vigilance has been equated with “sustained attention.” Attention requires alertness, selection of information, and conscious effort; alertness indicates the receptivity of the individual to external information ( Table 17.3 ). Mackworth, the father of vigilance research, defined vigilance as “a state of readiness to detect and respond to certain specified small changes occurring at random intervals in the environment.” Early research was stimulated by the errors of radar operators who performed the task of detecting barely perceivable events at infrequent and aperiodic intervals for extended periods of time.
Term | Definition |
---|---|
Perception | To attain awareness or understanding, usually via the senses |
Attention | A conscious effort to remain alert and to perceive and select information |
Vigilance | A state of readiness to detect and respond to changes in the monitored environment; a state of “sustained attention” |
Monitoring | A vigilance task involving the observation of one or several data streams in order to detect specified changes that often occur at random intervals |
Vigilance | A state of clinical awareness whereby dangerous conditions are anticipated or recognized |
Judgment | The formation of an opinion or evaluation based on available information |
Cognition | The act or process of knowing, including both awareness and judgment |
Decision-making | The act of choosing between alternative diagnoses or possible actions based on judgments |
Situation awareness | A coherent mental model or picture of the current state of a complex dynamic system, including an understanding of prior conditions and the implications of ongoing processes to future states |
The presence of “vigilance” in the official seal of the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) underscores the perceived importance of careful attention to details and detection of subtle signs out of the ordinary. Thus, in a broader sense, anesthetic vigilance might be viewed as a state of clinical awareness in which dangerous conditions are anticipated or recognized. Monitoring , by definition, is a vigilance task; thus, the administration of anesthesia is a complex monitoring task. The anesthesia caregiver must continuously evaluate the patient’s clinical status while assessing the effects of anesthetic and surgical interventions. Memory tasks, decision-making, and vigilance are the most vulnerable to compromise under the stressful work conditions often experienced in the operating room (OR). Although monitoring during quiescent periods of the maintenance phase of anesthesia appears to closely resemble the classic vigilance tasks studied in the laboratory, anesthesia practice commonly involves more complex situations that require divided attention, prioritization, and “situation awareness,” , skills that fall outside the classical definition of vigilance.
A large number of laboratory studies have demonstrated a decline in monitoring performance over time, called the vigilance decrement . This performance decline typically is complete within the first 30 minutes of a monitoring session. The vigilance decrement seems to arise primarily as a function of the necessity of attending to a relatively infrequent signal for a prolonged period of time.
Psychologists and engineers have studied vigilance for many years. Investigators in fields outside medicine, most notably aviation, have applied this information to understanding performance on complex monitoring tasks. Studies have identified environmentally induced factors and human/machine interface variables that can impair vigilance and performance in air traffic control, train driving, , automobile driving, and nuclear power plant control. The armed forces consider the potential impact of such factors at the earliest stages of the design of new weapons systems.
In most complex monitoring tasks, increased task complexity or task duration generally results in impaired performance ( Fig. 17.1 ). , A major factor in the effect of additional tasks on performance appears to be what personal resources, perceptual or cognitive, are required for each new task, and whether those resources are already taxed. Other factors known to impair vigilance include noise, environmental pollution, fatigue, sleep deprivation, and boredom. Performance also may be impaired if the individual is under stress, is in poor health, or uses medication that may impair clinical judgement. Personality factors, training, and experience also affect performance. Performance on complex monitoring tasks can be strongly affected by environmental or task variables. ,
In one of the first ergonomic studies of anesthesia, Drui and colleagues used time-motion analysis to examine how anesthesiologists spent their time in the OR. The practice of anesthesia was divided into a number of discrete activities, and the frequency and sequence of each activity were measured. One principal finding was that anesthesiologists directed their attention away from the patient 42% of the time. Additional time-and-motion studies have corroborated and expanded these early results. ,
Subsequent studies have examined the effects of the level of provider experience and of new technologies, such as electronic anesthesia record-keeping, , on the workload and vigilance of providers administering anesthesia. Others have investigated anesthesiologists’ vigilance to auditory and visual , , alarm cues and to changes in clinical variables in both the laboratory and during actual procedures. For example, Weinger and colleagues demonstrated that novice anesthesia residents were slower to detect the illumination of an alarm light placed within their monitoring array ( Fig. 17.2 ). The response rate was further impaired during periods of high workload, such as during the anesthetic induction.
Well-controlled studies are essential to understand the nature of anesthesia vigilance and monitoring performance. Studies should be designed to use techniques and procedures that have been repeatedly validated by investigators in other fields. Chapter 18 describes in more detail current research in anesthesia related to clinical performance.
A wide range of factors can affect vigilance and clinical performance in anesthesia ( Box 17.1 ). The following discussion provides a perspective on how a variety of everyday occurrences in the OR have the potential to significantly impair vigilance, potentially leading to increased risk of critical events and, as a result, anesthetic morbidity or death. The following sections address some of the more important performance-shaping factors organized into environmental, human, and equipment categories.
Noise
Temperature and humidity
Environmental toxicity
Ambient lighting
Workspace constraints
Human error and cognitive biases
Fatigue
Sleep deprivation (acute and chronic)
Circadian effects and shift work
Boredom
Substance use/abuse
State of health and stress
Aging
Training and experience
Psychosocial factors
Personality factors
Primary task load
Secondary task intrusion
Interruptions and distractions
Misinformation
Alarms and warnings
System-induced errors (e.g., latent errors)
Equipment failure
Equipment-induced errors
Faulty mental models of equipment design/function
Clumsy automation
The noise level in an OR can be quite high. In the early 1970s, Shapiro and Berland measured noise levels associated with specific tasks in the OR during several typical surgical procedures and found that the noise in an OR “frequently exceeds that of a freeway.” These findings appear to still be valid; continuous background noise in the modern OR may range from 75 to 90 dB ( Table 17.4 ). High-noise events include mechanical ventilation, suction, music, and conversation. Noise levels up to 118 dB can occur, notably during the operation of high-speed gas-turbine drills; suction tips with trapped tissue yield up to 96 dB. High noise levels create a positive feedback situation; noisy rooms require louder alarms and louder voices, which contribute to the noise, and so on.
Sound | Decibels |
---|---|
Jet ventilator | 120 |
Monitor alarm sounding (all alarms at highest setting) | 91 |
Humidifier (temperature probe not plugged in) | 86 |
Tourniquet (disconnect alarm) | 84 |
Anesthesia machine (loss of oxygen supply) | 84 |
Anesthesia machine (circuit disconnect) | 78 |
Infusion pump (occlusion alarm) | 77 |
Surgical instruments clanking against each other in a metal basin | 75 |
Monitor alarm sounding (all alarms; at standard setting) | 74 |
Electrocautery unit (return fault) | 74 |
Intercom | 72 |
Tonsil tip suction | 70 |
Pulse oximeter tone (maximum volume) | 66 |
Surgeon’s conversation (at patient’s ear) | 66 |
“Background” music at patient’s ear | 65 |
The effects of noise on performance depend on the type of noise and the task being performed. , In addition, other environmental and human factors can interact with noise to affect task performance. Noise levels similar to those found in ORs detrimentally affect short-term memory tasks and also may mask task-related cues and cause distractions during critical periods. Difficult tasks that require high levels of perceptual and/or information processing are negatively affected by noise, and long-term exposure to high noise levels produces physiologic changes consistent with stress. Exposure to loud noise activates the sympathetic nervous system, a situation that may augment the effects of other performance-shaping factors and result in impaired decision-making during critical incidents. ,
There is little doubt that background noise interferes with effective verbal communication. It is critical for the anesthesia caregiver to be able to hear clearly what other members of the OR team are saying. When multiple tasks are required, the presence of background noise may bias attention toward the dominant task. Although loud noise is clearly disruptive and can impair auditory vigilance—for instance, the ability to hear changes in pulse oximeter tone or to detect and identify alarms—studies have found a beneficial effect on complex task performance in the presence of lower levels of background (white) noise.
Several studies have suggested that the presence of familiar background music could improve vigilance. , A positive effect of preferred background music on surgeons’ mood and laboratory task performance was described. However, the validity of this study’s findings were questioned, with no data yet available on the impact of the surgeon’s preferred music on the anesthesiologist’s monitoring performance. What if the surgeon wanted to listen to country music, for example, and the anesthesiologist did not like that type of music? Swamidoss and colleagues studied the effects of background music on the performance of 30 anesthesia providers using a screen-based computerized anesthesia simulator. They found no significant differences in level of anxiety, time to recognition and correction of critical incidents, or autonomic responses whether subjects listened to their “most enjoyed music,” “least enjoyed music,” or “no music” at all. However, the number of subjects studied was small, and the applicability of these results to the actual OR environment remains to be examined.
Uncomfortable environmental temperatures, a common situ‑ation in many ORs, can impair vigilance. Although there appears to be significant variability in the effects of temperature on performance depending on the experimental situation (i.e., other environmental, task, and subject variables), as a general rule, temperatures that promote general fatigue decrease performance. Extremely cold temperatures have a deleterious effect on some cognitive tasks, primarily because of the distraction of the cold environment and the associated decrease in manual dexterity. These effects often show up as increased errors and memory deficits. Studies in the industrial workplace suggest that when temperatures fall outside a preferred range (17° to 23°C), workers are more likely to exhibit unsafe behaviors that could lead to occupational injury. Temperatures in some adult ORs can be as low as 7°C (44.6° F), and those in pediatric ORs may approach 30°C (86° F). The negative effects of temperature are probably augmented by other factors that enhance fatigue or impair performance.
There is extensive literature concerning the effects of trace anesthetic vapors on anesthesiologist performance. The early studies of Bruce and colleagues reported that exposure to 550 ppm nitrous oxide (N 2 O) and 14 ppm halothane led to a significant decrease in performance on complex vigilance tasks. Smith and Shirley subsequently showed that acute exposure to trace anesthetic gases in amounts commonly seen in an unscavenged OR had no effect on performance in naive volunteers. It thus appears that impaired vigilance related solely to trace anesthetic gases is not a problem in the modern, well-scavenged OR. A subsequent, well-controlled crossover study of anesthesiologists showed no differences in either mood or cognitive ability when working in a scavenged OR compared with working in an ICU (i.e., with no trace gases). However, other noxious odors or the need to wear bulky and uncomfortable protective gear could have an adverse impact on clinical performance.
Fatigue is caused by hours of continuous work or work overload, whereas boredom is believed to be a function of insufficient work challenge or understimulation. The two, nonetheless, often co-exist. Extreme fatigue results in objectively measurable symptoms of exhaustion and a psychological aversion to further work. There is marked individual variability in the response to factors or situations that can produce fatigue. The continued ability to perform skilled physical or mental tasks in the face of worsening fatigue strongly depends on psychological factors, including motivation. Although some extremely fatigued individuals can be induced to perform, the quality and wisdom of continued work under these circumstances is questionable, certainly so in situations in which human life may be at stake.
Few fatigue studies have used physicians as subjects. Those that have typically involved sleep loss and, primarily because of poor methodology, raised more questions than they answered. Fatigue and sleep loss often are covariants in studies that examine continuous, long work schedules; in turn, both are modulated by circadian processes. Because the effects of these variables interact, it is difficult to separate the relative contribution of each factor to the performance decrement observed.
Individuals subjected to excessive work, fatigue, or inappropriate shift schedules show degraded performance, impaired learning and thought processes, irritability, memory deficits, and interpersonal dysfunction. , Fatigued subjects pay less attention to peripherally located instruments and are inconsistent in their response to external stimuli. When coping with task demands, they exhibit less control over their own behavior and tend to select more risky alternatives (shortcuts). If sufficiently motivated, fatigued subjects can attain relatively normal performance on tasks of short duration, but they find it difficult to sustain performance on vigilance or monitoring tasks of long duration. , Adding sleep loss or shift work accentuates fatigue-induced performance decrements.
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