Physical Address
304 North Cardinal St.
Dorchester Center, MA 02124
One can approach the study of the brain and its pathophysiology from various perspectives with different levels of resolution: molecular, genetic, cellular, synaptic, systems, and behavioral.
Pathological processes and therapeutic interventions can target one or more of these levels, leading to a cascade of events that changes each of them.
Affect, behavior, and cognition are processed in specific brain circuits, and their altered function leads to the signs, symptoms, and syndromes that clinicians identify.
Neurobiological knowledge often provides mechanistic insight, explanation for behavior, and rationale for treatment, which are important to patients and families, as well as to providers.
Clinical presentation reflects an interaction of static and dynamic factors, including genetic and environmental ones, often mediated by adaptive or maladaptive plastic changes.
People with major mental illness suffer as a result of abnormal brain function. This is the fundamental premise of psychiatric neuroscience, which seeks to identify biological mechanisms underlying mental illness and the effects of psychiatric treatments. An essential goal is to characterize these mechanisms at the different levels of biological resolution that exist in the brain (from ions, to proteins, to DNA, to genes and chromosomes [that encode the structure and function of cells], to synapses, and finally to brain circuits that process affect, behavior, and cognition). This approach does not negate the critical role of psychological, social, and environmental factors; to the contrary, it provides a framework for understanding how these higher levels of resolution affect, and are affected by, neural function. A deeper understanding of brain mechanisms will provide better explanations for patients and families and lead to improvements in diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis.
Psychiatric neuroscience is one of the most interesting and challenging endeavors in all of medicine. While a great deal is already known, a wide gap remains between the clinical phenomena of affect, behavior, and cognition and neuroscientific explanations. The brain is extraordinarily complex and less physically accessible than other organ systems, posing great challenges to researchers. However, recent advances, particularly in neuroimaging and genetics, have provided important tools for tackling these problems. Although progress is difficult, the high prevalence, morbidity, and mortality rates of mental illness make progress essential. Mental health practitioners will need to incorporate the lessons learned from psychiatric neuroscience into everyday practice, and communicate them to patients, families, and members of the general public.
One might ask if the term “psychiatric neuroscience” is still valid. While it has traditionally related to neuroscience research with clinical relevance to disorders embedded within the limits of psychiatry, as opposed to neurology, these boundaries are becoming more porous as knowledge progresses and clinical practice adapts. The unclear limits between the two subspecialties have been defined historically by amorphous criteria, such as differences in clinical attitude (diagnostic vs. therapeutic) or brain function of interest (motor and sensory vs. affective and behavioral, with cognition always occupying an unclear frontier). Neurology once focused mainly on pathologies that resulted in major structural changes that one could observe in an autopsy or under a microscope. Though the label “functional” is at times still casually and inappropriately attached to neurological deficits of presumed “psychological” etiology, a neurobiological re-acquaintance with the original medical meaning of the word emphasizes physiological (functional) over anatomical (structural) pathophysiological mechanisms. This shift led to two very distinct clinical paradigms, one focused on finding the focal lesion and the other on identifying signs and symptoms that present in established syndromal patterns that can then be physiologically investigated.
As new generations of clinician scientists emerge who did not train in psychiatric or neurological neuroscience, but in systems neuroscience, translational efforts are highlighting the common principles of structure, function, pathology, and therapeutics. From this effort, new models are emerging with a clinical focus on brain circuits, as opposed to focal lesions or clinical syndromes. For scientists and clinicians alike it is, and will become increasingly, important to have an understanding of the different levels of biological resolution and how they influence each other in health, in disease, and in therapy. For clinicians treating disorders of affect, behavior, and cognition, it will be particularly important to understand the circuit level, as this is where mental states, including the pathological affective, behavioral, and cognitive states that we treat, are computed.
An important goal of this chapter will therefore be to explain the different levels of biological resolution that determine brain structure and function. A second goal will be to offer a framework with which the biological components of clinical cases may be formulated. This chapter provides an approach to conceptually organizing the biological component of our work with patients, from the dual vantage points of pathophysiology and mechanisms of treatment.
Psychiatry has a strong neuroscientific tradition. Describing all of the important contributions to brain science made by psychiatric researchers could fill many chapters; here we will cite only a few illustrative examples. Early in the last century, the German psychiatrist and neuropathologist Alois Alzheimer discovered plaques and tangles in the brain of his amnestic patient Mrs. Auguste D. and provided the first description of the clinical syndrome that now bears his name. Together with his colleague and renowned psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin, Alzheimer also described abnormalities in the cortical neurons of patients with dementia praecox, likely representing the first neuropathological studies of schizophrenia. Their discoveries have been extended to the molecular level in modern studies identifying abnormalities in γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA)–ergic neurons of the prefrontal cortex. While Alzheimer's passion was neuropathology, he also spent many years caring for patients with mental illness. Reflecting on his life's work, he reportedly said that he “wanted to help psychiatry with the microscope.”
Another historical landmark in psychiatric neuroscience was the demonstration of genetic predispositions to major mental illness. Danish adoption studies in the 1960s reported a much greater incidence of schizophrenia in biological as opposed to adoptive relatives of people with schizophrenia, providing key evidence for a significant etiological role of genetics in a psychiatric illness. Other landmark contributions include the work of Julius Axelrod, Ulf von Euler, and Bernard Katz on neurotransmitters and their mechanisms of release, reuptake, and metabolism; their discoveries, recognized with a Nobel Prize in 1970, provide a foundation for much of the content of this chapter. In the 1970s, the discovery that antipsychotic medications targeted brain dopamine receptors led to the influential dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia. Later, converging work characterizing information processing in the brain at a molecular level earned Arvid Carlsson, Paul Greengard, and Eric Kandel the 2000 Nobel Prize at the end of the decade of the brain. These brief highlights emphasize the great progress already attributable to psychiatric neuroscience, and illustrate the great potential for important discoveries in the future.
In the context of psychiatric neuroscience, the recent diagnostic system (DSM-IV-TR) has both strengths and weaknesses. A major advance of the post-1980s DSM was the development of diagnostic categories of psychiatric illness with good inter-rater reliability, largely based on observation and data collection. This provided a firm starting point for scientific investigation, in contrast to previous diagnostic systems based on unproven etiological theories and associated ill-defined terminology. However, the intentional avoidance of etiological theories in generating DSM diagnoses also makes their biological validity uncertain; the extent to which specific DSM diagnoses correspond to specific pathological neural processes is unknown. Unlike most medical illnesses, the vast majority of psychiatric illnesses have so far not been tightly linked to specific biological markers. The descriptive criteria demarcating current diagnoses are likely several steps removed from core pathological processes.
These diagnostic difficulties can be illustrated by comparing the diagnosis of schizophrenia to that of methicillin-resistant streptococcal pneumonia, a medical diagnosis with obvious biological validity. While pneumonia has a collection of clinical signs and symptoms that may be non-specific and variable (e.g., fever, productive cough, and shortness of breath), it implies a distinct pathophysiology (infection of lung tissue leading to an inflammatory reaction). Subdividing the diagnosis by the infectious agent links it to a specific biological etiology, with tremendous value in guiding prognosis and treatment. In contrast, the diagnosis of schizophrenia, while it has a high level of inter-rater reliability, is not based at present on known biomarkers or pathophysiological mechanisms. It is therefore confined to the syndromic level, comprising a cluster of variable and non-specific clinical features. It can be further divided into more specific clinical subtypes, but these suffer from the same shortcomings. Just as pneumonia may have various specific etiologies, schizophrenia may also have diverse causes; most likely it does not reflect a single “disease.” Recent advances in genetics reinforce this conclusion. While schizophrenia is highly heritable, linkage and association studies indicate in the majority of cases that it is a disorder of complex genetics, in which multiple genes of modest effect interact with environmental risk factors to cause the phenotype. In light of these issues, one of the major goals of psychiatric neuroscience is to identify specific biomarkers and pathophysiological mechanisms for each disorder.
Researchers have adopted a variety of methods for studying the neural mechanisms of mental illness and behavior ( Box 1-1 ). Each of these methods has particular strengths and weakness.
Animal models
Brain lesion cases
Brain stimulation and neuromodulation
Genetics and molecular biology
Neuroimaging
Neuropathology
Neurophysiology
Neuropsychology/endophenotypes
Psychopharmacology
There is a strong tradition within classical neuropsychology and behavioral neurology of understanding neuroanatomical circuitry by studying the emergent or lost behaviors in patients with focal brain lesions. These studies have provided us with a rich view of various brain regions and their relationship to behavior. Perhaps the most famous case is that of Phineas Gage, the Vermont railway worker who suffered a traumatic lesion bilaterally to the medial frontal lobes and developed personality changes. Another famous patient (known by his initials) is H. M., who underwent bilateral medial temporal lobe resection for intractable epilepsy and as a result lost the ability to form new declarative memories. While striking and informative, findings from these rare cases may be difficult to extrapolate to the pathophysiology of common psychiatric illnesses, which generally do not involve focal lesions. Traditionally, biological psychiatry has relied more on biometrics and quantitative methods; these population-based approaches risk losing insights available from rare cases but are more likely to produce broadly generalizable findings.
An increasingly important approach in psychiatric neuroscience is to identify and study intermediate phenotypes. These are quantitative phenotypes that are closely associated with the clinical syndrome of interest, but which are less complex and easier to link to the function of specific neural circuits. They can also be used to identify biologically relevant subtypes within a diagnostic category, reducing heterogeneity that may limit the power of scientific investigations. Endophenotypes are intermediate phenotypes that are present both in affected individuals and in their unaffected relatives, therefore reflecting genetic risk independent of actual disease. Neuropsychological tests of cognitive function are commonly used to identify endophenotypes. For example, impairment of working memory, which is closely related to the function of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, is found within a subgroup of patients with schizophrenia. Endophenotypes thus help bridge the gap between brain circuits, which are amenable to study at the molecular and cellular level, and clinical syndromes, which are less tractable. This approach becomes especially powerful when combined with other methods, such as neuroimaging or genetics.
Neuroimaging has provided one of the best modern tools for examining the pathophysiology of mental illness in the living brain. Neuroimaging can provide many different quantitative measures (including morphometry, metabolism, and functional activity). Neuroimaging research using groups of subjects can determine whether mental illness is associated with changes in the size or shape of specific brain regions, the functional activity within these regions, or their concentration of particular neurotransmitters, receptors, or key metabolites. Although neuroimaging methods can be used to measure cellular and molecular phenomena, the currently achievable spatial resolution still represents an important limitation in examining the microscopic pathological changes implicated in psychiatric illness.
There is a strong tradition within psychiatric neuroscience of studying the electrical activity of the brain and its relation to function. These methods include electroencephalography (EEG), event-related potentials (ERPs), and, most recently, magnetoencephalography (MEG), and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Like functional neuroimaging, these modalities provide information about the living, functioning brain. At present, electrophysiological techniques cannot provide anatomical resolution at the level of neurochemistry or synaptic physiology, and are limited to the study of cortical phenomena; however, they can provide excellent temporal and spatial resolution and are invaluable in studying the coordinated function of widely distributed neural circuits. Abnormalities in the timing of oscillations in neural circuit activity have been associated with psychiatric illnesses, and this is an area of intense research activity. For example, the reduction of gamma frequency (30 to 80 Hz) oscillations in schizophrenia has been ascribed to impaired N- methyl- d -aspartate (NMDA) receptor activity on GABA-ergic interneurons. These non-invasive methods are particularly heavily used in studies of brain development and function in children.
Brain stimulation and neuromodulation techniques encompass a variety of device-based methodologies able to generate focal electrical currents in pre-selected brain regions. These currents are able to increase or decrease the excitability of the target neurons, and modulate the networks they belong to by acting as a neural pacemaker.
Brain stimulation can be divided among invasive and non-invasive approaches. Invasive techniques require the surgical implantation of stimulating electrodes in the brain, and are therefore exclusively used in therapeutic settings where the risk/benefit analysis is favorable. They include deep brain stimulation (DBS) and vagus nerve stimulation (VNS). Non-invasive methods do not require surgery or anesthesia, are very safe, and alter brain function in ways that are transient and reversible. The better-known and most commonly used methods are transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). Chapter 18 describes these methods and their therapeutic applications in detail.
TMS has been used since the mid 1980s as a tool to study brain structure and function. Event-related paradigms using single pulses time-locked to a given stimulus or task have been used to determine the chronometry of the computations in a given brain region with great temporal resolution (in the order of milliseconds). Repetitive TMS (rTMS) can increase or decrease the excitability of a given area beyond the time of stimulation, creating a “virtual lesion” that lasts 15–60 minutes after the stimulation. This virtual lesion approach has been used, following the tradition of classical lesion studies, to understand the functional role of discrete brain regions.
Although neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques are defined by their spatial and temporal resolution, what sets brain stimulation methods apart is their causal resolution . Neuroimaging and electrophysiological methods are observational; they measure patterns of brain activity (the dependent variable) in the context of a given task or disease state (independent variable). Such a design is able to establish correlations among these measures, but can never determine that a given pattern of brain activity is causing a mental state (or vice versa). On the other hand, brain stimulation techniques are interventional. They modify the system by changing brain activity (now the independent variable) and measure the behavioral, cognitive or affective changes that follow. This design offers causal explanatory power, which makes it a useful tool to answer a number of questions.
Many researchers examine post-mortem neural tissue from those who suffered from psychiatric illness during their life-time. Post-mortem analysis reaches a level of molecular and cellular resolution currently unachievable in vivo ; however, it is commonly limited by confounds (such as age, effects of chronic medication, and non-specific effects of chronic psychiatric illness).
Neuropathology was clearly in fashion in the late 1800s and early 1900s, when Alzheimer first described plaques in the brain of his patient with dementia, and identified frontal cortex abnormalities in schizophrenia. While some skeptics have described schizophrenia as the “graveyard of neuropathologists,” recent studies have actually provided reproducible descriptions of deficits (such as those in parvalbumin-expressing GABA-ergic interneurons in deep layers 3 and 4, akin to Alzheimer's findings) in the cortex. These neuropathological findings have provided one of the strongest etiological hypotheses for schizophrenia.
More than any other methodology in psychiatric neuroscience, pharmacology has been used to understand the neurochemical basis of behavior and to develop hypotheses regarding psychopathological mechanisms. Famous examples include the dopamine and glutamate hypotheses of schizophrenia, the catecholamine depletion hypothesis of depression, and the dopaminergic models of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and substance abuse. In relating pharmacological effects to potential disease mechanisms, it is important to note that the effects of drugs on clinical symptoms may reflect mechanisms that are downstream of the core pathophysiology, or even unrelated to core disease mechanisms. By analogy, diuretics can improve the symptoms of congestive heart failure while providing less direct insight into its core pathophysiology. Nonetheless, by clearly connecting cellular and synaptic mechanisms with clinical symptoms, pharmacology provides mechanistic tools and information with enormous clinical and scientific utility.
In the authors' opinion, the value of animal experiments has received too little emphasis in psychiatric neuroscience. Clearly, complex psychiatric symptoms (such as delusions) cannot be modeled well in animals, and anthropomorphic interpretations of animal behavior should be taken with due skepticism. Despite these caveats, animal behaviors with known neuroanatomical correlates have been critical in elucidating the neurocircuitry and neurochemistry underlying many psychiatric phenomena. For example, anxiety- and fear-related behaviors have been very productively modeled in animals, leading to a detailed understanding of the role of the amygdala in these behaviors. Of course, animal studies also permit a wider range of experimental perturbations than possible with human investigations. Independent of their value as behavioral models, animal models therefore offer the opportunity to explore cellular and molecular pathophysiology in ways that are ethically or technically impossible in human subjects. For example, the fragile X knock-out mouse is an excellent model for fragile X syndrome, the most common form of inherited cognitive impairment. Studying these mice has led to a deep understanding of relevant defects in dendrite formation and neurophysiology.
Adoption, twin, and familial segregation studies have proven that many psychiatric conditions are highly heritable (i.e., caused in large part by the additive effect of genes). Genetic endeavors in psychiatric neuroscience may be broken up into two broad categories: “forward genetics,” or genome-wide attempts to identify genetic loci (genes or their regulatory elements) that underlie susceptibility or contribute to pathophysiology; and “genotype-phenotype” studies, whereby candidate genes are chosen based on a priori biological hypotheses and the degree to which a gene plays a role in a given phenotype is assessed. Such phenotypes may be clinical diagnoses, or endophenotypes from neuropsychology or neuroimaging. The promise for human genetics in psychiatry is tremendous, especially for forward genetics, wherein researchers may be led to the core pathophysiology without requiring any a priori hypotheses. Yet human genetics research is exceedingly challenging for various reasons that are beyond the scope of the current discussion. In brief, the genetic architecture of neuropsychiatric conditions is heterogeneous and complex. That is, the majority of psychiatric illnesses likely reflect complex interactions of multiple genes, as well as their interaction with environmental factors that are difficult to assess. Despite these difficulties, there have already been a few notable examples of success.
Analysis of rare, large families with early-onset dementia led to the discovery of mutations in amyloid precursor protein (APP) and presenilins in Alzheimer's disease (AD). In these rare families, these mutations are statistically “linked” to disease and considered “highly penetrant.” However, the vast majority of AD patients do not have mutations in these genes. Indeed, in psychiatry examples of highly penetrant, simple dominant or recessive gene mutations are rare. That is, examples in neuropsychiatry of a particular gene mutation “causing” a specific condition are exceedingly rare and somewhat controversial, and the generalizability of these findings to the common conditions with more complex inheritance is usually unclear. Nonetheless, the APP pathway has provided an important target for drug development, which may lead to a medicine that stalls the progress of disease.
Genetic association studies through population genetics represent another approach to identifying susceptibility genes in “forward genetics.” In this approach, a common variation in the genome, such as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), is assessed for a statistically significant association with illness. This approach is based on the so-called common disease–common variant hypothesis. That is, psychiatric disorders may be in part due to a disadvantageous combination of a number of common forms of genetic variation as opposed to frank deleterious mutations. Again, a successful example of a gene association in neuropsychiatry comes from the field of AD wherein there is a fairly robust association at the level of population genetics or epidemiology between a common polymorphism in ApoE4 and susceptibility to AD. However, sometimes even when genetic associations are robust, the amount of the phenotype (i.e., the variance) that is explained by the given gene may be small and therefore the role in causation may be indirect or unclear. In addition, association studies have often used small sample sizes and thereby risked false-positive findings or problems of reproducibility. Now, appropriately-powered association studies (involving thousands of subjects) are underway; many of these use new and more powerful high-density genotype methods, namely “SNP chips” or microarrays. Even still, critical insights into the causative roles of genes in some psychiatric illness may only come from studies of gene–gene or gene–environmental interaction, or by using endophenotypes (such as neuroimaging) that may be closer to the action of the gene.
Methodologies in molecular genetics and molecular neuroscience also promise improved understanding of gene function in the brain. These methods include the following: comparison of gene sequences in human to non-human primate and other animals ; a deeper understanding of how non-coding elements within the genome may regulate important brain genes and thereby play a role in psychiatry; the study of gene expression using microarrays ; the study of gene function in mice in which specific genes have been modified by recombinant methods (e.g., “knock-out” or “knock-in” studies) ; and studies examining how experience and the environment alter gene expression. In summary, genomics and molecular genetics hold great promise for identifying genes and thus biological mechanisms at the core of psychiatric pathophysiology.
Clinical case formulation in psychiatry is structured around the bio-psycho-social model. In this chapter, we offer a framework for formulating the biological aspects of this model. Specifically, neuroscientific explanations may be organized in two broad conceptual areas: process and content. Process refers to dynamic brain mechanisms that lead to illness, while content refers to the brain properties including neural circuits, brain regions, synapses, cells, and molecules that form the substrate for these changes.
A key concept in basic neuroscience and its clinical specialties is neuroplasticity. Although it is defined in different ways and can be studied at various levels of resolution (e.g., circuits, synapses), this term generally refers to the capacity of the neural system to change in response to external or internal stimuli following predetermined rules. Neuroplasticity provides a great deal of flexibility and adaptive capacity to the brain, permitting variable computational strategies and patterns of connectivity in a changing environment. Despite the significant potential for reactive (and adaptive) change, this happens around an exquisitely regulated homeostatic equilibrium point. Nevertheless, when the plastic changes are restricted, excessive, or occur around an altered equilibrium state, pathology develops. Luckily, the brain remains plastic, and any intervention (e.g., medications, psychotherapy or brain stimulation) that is effective in changing pathological cognition, behavior or affect induces adaptive plasticity. That is, a pathological mental state is sustained by a given pattern of brain activity, and changing this mental state will require changing its associated neural computational algorithm. Therefore, neuroplasticity is a key dynamic property of the brain that allows adaptive change (including learning and memory), but it is also an important source of pathology, and a necessary mechanism of action of effective neuropsychiatric treatments.
Although the specific pathophysiological mechanisms that lead to neuropsychiatric disease are many, we will consider two relevant examples: neurodevelopment, and neurodegeneration. Under neurodevelopment we include related processes that continue into adulthood (such as neurogenesis). Previously underestimated, adult neurogenesis is now known to continue in select regions of the human brain, most notably the olfactory bulb and the hippocampus. Although the role of adult neurogenesis in humans remains largely unknown, some evidence has connected altered hippocampal neurogenesis to mood disorders.
Neurodevelopmental processes shaping brain circuits have life-long effects on patterns of affect, behavior, and cognition with direct relevance to mental health. The effects of childhood experience have always been central to psychiatric understanding; psychiatric neuroscience has also attempted to provide a biological grounding for this understanding. Thus, neurodevelopmental processes include the interacting effects of genes and environment on brain and behavior. Figure 1-1 shows the processes of brain development, including intrauterine neuronal patterning, neurogenesis, cortical migration, gliogenesis, myelination, and experience-dependent synapse modification. In the first years and decade of life, the brain undergoes a process of synapse formation and pruning. Initially, neurons form an over-abundance of synapses that are then strengthened and pruned possibly based on experience, learning, or aging ( Figure 1-2 ).
Specific psychiatric disorders may be framed in terms of one or more of these three mechanisms. Autism or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder are examples in which a process of brain development goes awry. At the other end of life, neurodegenerative processes dominate, and can lead to dementias (e.g., Alzheimer's or frontotemporal lobar degeneration) or movement disorders (such as Parkinson's disease). Substance use disorders may reflect a combination of both processes modulated by maladaptive plasticity. Patients with substance dependence may have a susceptibility based on neurodevelopment, including a predisposition to risk-taking behaviors. Substance abuse also causes neuroplastic changes at the level of the synapse. Finally, chronic use of substances can cause neurodegeneration and dementia.
Become a Clinical Tree membership for Full access and enjoy Unlimited articles
If you are a member. Log in here